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Abstract: 
Small holders’ agriculture is currently facing new stakes due to State’s withdrawal from 
agricultural support and to higher market requests for producing agricultural products. 
Different coordination mechanisms can be observed inside the supply chains involving 
farmers, farmers’ organizations, and others stakeholders. They depend on the nature of the 
product, the characteristics of the stakeholders involved, the technical specifications related 
to the transactions, and the institutional environment. Relying on a comparative case study 
methodology, the paper analyzes the consequences of different coordination mechanisms 
on inclusion or exclusion of small farmers in the northern region of Costa Rica. Market 
coordination could be an efficient way to integrate farmers in supply chains in the case of 
low technical specifications and of existence of adequate selling mechanisms. Hybrid 
coordination is the main mechanism and facilitates the inclusion of small farmers, 
depending on the farmers’ organizations capacities to negotiate adequate rules. In some 
situations hybrid coordination with captive relationships could occur but leads to a more or 
less rapid exclusion process.  
 
 
Keywords: Supply chain, Small holders, Farmers’ organization, Contracting, Coordination, 
Costa Rica 
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 1 Introduction 
1.1 Economic liberalization and coordination mechanisms 
In developing countries the agricultural sector is rapidly changing. On the one hand, the 
new public policies encourage the State withdrawal from agricultural supports and the 
liberalization of trade exchanges. On the other hand, corporate food producers and 
processors, food industries, and the supermarkets have a stronger influence on 
smallholders’ production systems and market orientation (Berdegué et al. 2005). These 
changes illustrate a harder competition on the international markets but also more concerns 
from the consumers’ point of view for product characteristics. In this sense, quality 
standards, impacts on the environment, and laborers’ conditions involved in the process 
become important issues for product choice.  
 
In this context new coordination mechanisms occur to deal with such evolutions, especially 
amongst farmers themselves, and between farmers’ organizations and food industries or 
supermarkets. These coordination mechanisms are usually based on contractual 
arrangements with different specifications derived from a negotiation process. The nature 
of the coordination depends on the stakeholders’ strategies and resources. The coordination 
takes place in asymmetrical conditions between stakeholders and generates new commodity 
chains’ governance mechanisms. In fact the new context leads a rapid evolution at the 
production level to improve the quality and stability in order to comply with the demand of 
food industries and supermarkets. Small farmers face huge challenges to really benefit from 
opportunities derived from this new market conditions and to avoid an exclusion process. 
To access to markets smallholders need to develop new capabilities and skills, both 
individually at farm level and collectively at farmers’ organization level. 
 
The paper seeks to understand the effects of different coordination mechanisms on 
smallholders and their organizations, within different supply chains. More specifically our 
analysis is focused on the strategies followed by farmers in northern Costa Rica in order to 
gain access to the markets. 
 
1.2 What is saying the literature about the theoretical background? 
In the new institutional economics field, the coordination mechanisms are diverse and 
aimed at limiting the transaction costs. The transaction costs are positively related with (i) 
the uncertainty about the product and the stakeholders’ behavior and (ii) the specific assets 
and investments of each stakeholder. They are negatively related with the transaction 
frequency which improves the information on each stakeholder and the trust among them 
(Williamson, 1991). This author identifies basically three coordination mechanisms: the 
market, the hierarchy and hybrid coordination. The market coordination refers to situation 
where the different actors of the transaction freely transfer property rights taking into 
account only the price of the product as reference of the transaction. The hierarchical 
coordination refers to situation where the relationship between actors is ruled by the 
authority not by the price of the product. The hybrid form refers to situation where the 
relationship between actors is ruled not only by the price but also by other factors including 
social factors (habit, convention, etc.). According to the literature, the market coordination 
tends to be more efficient when the transaction costs are low, which rarely occurs in the 
agricultural sector, the hierarchy coordination when there are high levels of transaction 
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costs and risks. Between these two poles, hybrid coordination mechanisms arise and some 
of them in the form of contractual arrangements. Therefore, contracts take an intermediate 
position, allowing the buyer to participate and exert different levels of control over the 
production process without formal property rights on the provider’s assets. Contract allows 
a reduction of the risks and the transaction costs (Key and Runsten, 1999). Under certain 
market conditions, contracts may induce or not induce collective actions among 
stakeholders (Sáenz, 2006). There is not a single type of contract and a large set of options 
are usually adopted. Hobbs (1996) describes different types of contract with (i) contracts 
defining the characteristics of the product, (ii) contracts including in addition controls on 
the process to produce the product, and (iii) contracts including in addition services 
providing to guarantee the process and the product quality. Taking into account the 
diversity of relationships between actors and, besides market and hierarchy, Gereffi et al. 
(2005) consider a spectrum running from low to high level of coordination and power 
asymmetry between buyers and suppliers. In the modular chain the two actors are quiet 
independent with low level of specific assets, the relational value chain creates mutual 
dependence with high level of specific assets, in the captive chains the small suppliers 
depend on much larger buyers.  
 
The nature of the contract depends on the negotiation between stakeholders. Williamson 
(1991) shows that some parameters influence the nature of the contract: (i) the uncertainty 
related to the level of information on the market and the stakeholders’ behavior, (ii) the 
negotiation power related to economic and political strength of each stakeholder, (iii) the 
level of specialization related to the flexibility of each stakeholder to be able to transform 
its production system, and (iv) the enforcement system base on trust relationships or legal 
frameworks. But the contract is insufficient to understand the complexity of the 
coordination mechanisms, especially in the rural area. From his point of view, Albert 
(2000) adds to the three main “classical” modalities of coordination the non-market 
solidarity system participating in the regulation of the relationships between farmers based 
on different values. 
 
According to this conceptual framework in the agricultural sector the coordination 
mechanisms largely depend on the supply chain characteristics. The parameters which have 
an influence on the supply chains are (Faure 2007), (i) the kind of the product (especially 
the perishability) and the techniques to process the product, (ii) the characteristics of the 
stakeholders especially the geographical distribution and the level of specialization of the 
farms or the specific investments in the food industries, (iii) the market requests with more 
or less in depth technical specifications, and (iv) the institutional framework including 
public policies and access to services. Among farmers and inside farmers’ organizations the 
coordination mechanisms tend to be mainly based on non-market solidarity system, 
contracts or hierarchy. Between farmers’ organizations and processors, supermarkets, or 
exporters the coordination mechanisms are mainly based on contracts. But in some cases 
occur coordination mechanisms through spot market or hierarchy at different level of the 
supply chain. In some supply chains more global institutional arrangements as inter 
professional bodies or quaternary institution (Bourgeois, 1998), are implemented to 
facilitate common agreements between the main stakeholders. 
 
Small farmers’ should gain a better access to international and national markets if they 
move into integrated supply chains with others stakeholders. A better integrated supply 
chain should lead to a minimization of the system-wide costs (including transaction costs), 
while satisfying as much as possible the stakeholders’ objectives (Simchi-Levi et al., 2000).  
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However, there are also evidences that this integration benefits only certain type of farmers, 
while excludes part of the smallholders. Literature review enables to identified different 
types of specific constraints concerning smallholder farmers that lead to market exclusion: 
(i) specific production constraints with limited access to production factors (land, labour 
force and capital), (ii) lack of human and social capital including low bargaining power, 
(iii) specific trade constraints such as a lack of infrastructures or market entry barriers, (iv) 
high transaction costs related to access to information, negotiation and monitoring, and (v) 
risks management  related to the natural environment, the prices or the behaviour of the 
stakeholders (Ruben et al. 1994, Jaffee S. 1995, Bienabe et al. 2004). 
 
A supply chain integrating small farmers is based on the implementation of alternative 
markets institutions, and a collaborative-based strategy to link stakeholders’ operations in 
order to improve the position in the market (Sáenz 2006). Some authors have pointed out 
the importance of farmers’ organizations or cooperative in order to limit the transaction 
costs and to gain better bargaining power (Dyer and Singh 1998, Key and Runsten 1999). 
Farmers’ organizations play different instrumental functions in designing collective actions: 
(i) economic functions in the field of production, processing and marketing of agricultural 
products or in the field of natural resources management, (ii) social functions for its 
members or for the rural community through advocacy, information sharing, capacities 
strengthening, or coordination between stakeholders from the local to the global level 
(Rondot and Collion, 2001, Bosc et al. 2003). To improve their position in the supply chain 
farmers through farmers’ organizations intent to promote (i) new forms of smallholders 
cooperation that focus on developing dynamic competitive advantages (Menard, 2004) or 
(ii) new collective strategies for reaching economies of scale in marketing operations, 
strengthening bargaining power, controlling risks, creating alliances for improving 
competitiveness through upgrading of quality and generating aggregated value (Bijman and 
Ruben, 2005). The key issues for farmers’ organizations are related to coordination 
mechanisms among members and to coordination mechanisms between farmers’ 
organization and others stakeholders (Biénabé et al. 2004, Ménard 2007). 
 
1.3 Methodological approach 
 
The paper is based on the comparison of four empirical supply chains case studies of the 
main agricultural products in the northern region of Costa Rica: beef, milk, bean, and 
pineapple. For each case study we drew a map of the stakeholders involved in the supply 
chain. We carried out surveys : (i) at farm level (farming system analysis, historical 
evolutions,  farm typologies, marketing strategies, etc.), (ii) with the main farmers’ 
organizations involved in the supply chain (history, activities, rules, external relationships, 
etc.), (iii) with some of the private firms involved in the supply chains (activities, sourcing 
with local farmers and sourcing from others stakeholders, etc.), and (iv) with the main 
bodies as boards, committees, or national organizations regulating the relationships in the 
supply chain (objectives, activities, main results, etc.).  
 
Coordination is analyzed through transaction. We distinguish three theoretical stages: 
production, transformation, and distribution that we consider as a transfer of property rights 
(North, 1990). For each transaction, we describe the relationships existing between them. 
We put special emphasis on (i) the formal and informal rules regulating these transactions 
especially between farmers and farmers’ organizations and between farmers’ organizations 
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and others stakeholders and (ii) the governance structure. A governance structure can be 
defined as the “authority and power relationships that determine how financial, material and 
human resources are allocated and flow within a chain” (Gereffi, 1994). More generally, it refers 
to the ability of an actor to strongly influence or even determine the activities of other actors in the 
chain. 
 
In the next section we describe the coordination mechanisms that characterize each one of 
the supply chain studied, and show how these coordination mechanisms have evolved 
through time. We then analyze some attributes of transactions, thus providing explanatory 
elements of the situations described. In section 3 we demonstrate that these different 
coordination mechanisms have different implications on farmers and farmers’ 
organizations. 
 
2 Description of coordination mechanisms in different supply chains 
After a long period of strong State interventions in agriculture to promote food crops for the 
national market, from the mid-80’s the country encouraged exported crops through new 
farmers’ organizations or private export firms. From the mid-90’s the State reduced its 
intervention in this region modifying the rules of the game. The farmers involved in the 
different supply chains have different characteristics but most of them face strong 
difficulties explaining a regular decrease in the farms number (table 1). 
 
Table 1: Characteristics of family farms in the Northern Region 
Type of 
farm 
Livestock 
(beef) and food 
crops (bean, 
rice, etc.) with 
mechanization 
Extensive 
livestock 
(beef) 
Livestock 
producing 
cheese and 
beef 
Livestock 
producing 
milk 
Exported 
products : 
pineapple, 
yucca, 
plantain, 
ornamental 
plants, etc. 
Sugar 
cane 
Diversified 
farms 
(organic 
agriculture, 
rural 
tourism, etc.)
Settlement
in difficulti
(livestock
food crops
cash crops
Number of 
farmers 
2000 1500 3500 1500 3500 1000 1000 4000 
Surface / 
farm (ha) 
50-300 50-500 
 
10-50 10-50 
 
1-30 
 
3-100 
 
5-30 5-20 
 
Evolution of 
the farmers’ 
number * 
 
- - 
 
- - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 - 
 
0 
 
+ + 
 
- - 
From Faure and Samper 2005  
*  :  ++ : strong increase ; + : light increase; 0 : stability ; - : light decrease ; - - strong decrease 
 
The evolutions of coordination mechanisms are quiet different depending on the supply 
chain (Maitre d’Hôtel, 2006), and thus on the four parameters mentioned above (kind of the 
product, characteristics of the stakeholders, market requests, and institutional environment).  
 
2.1 Beef sector 
The beef sector is one of the oldest and most important for small farmers in the northern 
region (table 1) but with few stakeholders involved in the downstream segment of the 
supply chain. The market coordination is the main modality unchanged for many years as 
all large scale farmers directly sell their cattle through three auctions market located in the 
region and usually managed by special farmers’ organizations (CORFOGA, 2005). Small 
farmers sell their animals either directly in the auctions markets or through intermediaries 
able to transport them to the auction market place. The auctions market functions as a spot 
 6/21 
market where the demand meets the offer with some transparency in the price definition. 
Part of the exchanges is also between farmers specialized in some rearing activities, and 
part is between farmers and firms working with slaughterhouses. But in this latter case, 
contract coordination mechanism is more developed and involves especially large scale 
farmers that are more able to negotiate directly with processors (figure 1) but without 
strong technical specification which implies “modular coordination” in the sense of Gereffi 
et al. (2005). 
 
Figure 1: Coordination mechanisms in the beef sector 
 
2.2 Bean sector 
The coordination mechanisms of the bean sector considerably changed in the last years. 
Before 1994, the prevailing coordination mechanisms was a hierarchical one (State-run 
hierarchical coordination) as public institutions bought all the production at a fixed price 
(Salazar 2003). Since 1995, the coordination mechanisms are mainly “market” or secondly 
“hybrid”. This important shift has to be related with (i) State withdrawal from agricultural 
support to bean production in 1994 (Ruiz 2002) and to (ii) Costa Rica adhesion to World 
Trade Organization in 1994 and frontiers opening.  
 
The nowadays the main coordination mechanisms, represented in the figure 2, are ruled by 
market between farmers and private firms or intermediaries. But Costa Rica only provides 
23% of the consumption and others countries (Argentina and Nicaragua) provide 77% of 
the consumption. A national commission with farmers’ representatives, importers, and 
industrials regulates part of the importations to maintain national production.  
 
But hybrid coordination appears as an alternative to market coordination. It takes place as 
annual based contracts or formal agreements between organizations and private firms of 
transformation and distribution. Those contracts or agreements aim at stabilizing the trade 
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relationships between the bean producers (and their organizations) and the private firms 
that are interested especially in (i) reducing transaction costs resulting from the research of 
bean providers during the short harvesting period and (ii) improve and control the product 
quality by specifying standards. This type of contract looks like “modular coordination” as 
it doesn’t entail a high level of specific assets. If this kind of coordination is an important 
one for small farmers since it reduces their marketing risks, it remains that it only 
represents a small part of the total market shares (less than 10%) but near the 40% of the 
national production (see figure 2).  
 
Figure 2 : Coordination mechanisms in the bean sector 
 
 
 
2.3 Milk sector 
In the milk sector, the main form of coordination mechanisms is the contract but mainly 
based on “captive coordination” and “relational coordination” (figure 3). Those 
coordination mechanisms currently observed has been constituted around fifty years ago 
and depend on two different economical key actors. The first actor is CoopeDosPinos, a 
farmers’ cooperative that manage 85% of the domestic market share (Montero 2004). It is 
reinforcing its situation of quasi-monopole on the domestic market and is developing 
exportations towards central-american and north-american markets (Melendez and 
Gonzalez 1998). This cooperative has vertically integrated different functions of the supply 
chain (i) by buying all the milk to the farmers under strict technical specifications and by 
providing obligatory services, (ii) by managing manufactures to process the milk and (iii) 
by developing strong alliances to control the distribution activities. Inside the 
CoopeDosPinos the coordination mechanisms refer to “captive coordination”. Asset 
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specificity is very high as the farmers cannot easily shift from milk production to another 
activity; the contracts between the farmers and the cooperative include a control on the 
product and on the process (Hobbs 1996) with a high administrative control. Such a 
coordination mechanism provides protection for specific investments and is a relatively 
efficient one for responding to change where coordinated adaptation is necessary.  
 
The second type of actor, are others private firms and other farmers’ organizations that 
collect and process milk under contractual mechanisms. Those actors refer to a market 
share of 15% (SEPSA 2002).  In the case of private firms and farmers organizations, the 
coordination mechanism is a “hybrid” type with “relational coordination” between farmers 
and processors as farmers can shift from one processor to another but not easily from milk 
production to another production. In some cases long-term contracts are signed up between 
processors and farmers or retailers to decrease the commercial risks, in other cases informal 
agreements exist but trust is a strong incentive to maintain stable relationships. 
 
Figure 3: Coordination mechanisms in the milk sector 
 
 
2.4 Pineapple sector 
The pineapple sector is nowadays characterized by the co-existence of three different 
coordination mechanisms:  
- Hierarchy coordination mechanisms correspond to national or international private 
firms installed in Costa Rica since the 90s (Quesada 1999) that integrated vertically 
the functions of production, packaging and distribution. Most of them only work on 
the export sector. These firms correspond to the highest market share (about 90%).  
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- Hybrid coordination mechanisms correspond (i) to farmers’ organizations 
(represented as Organization 1 on the figure 4) that are progressively integrating 
toward packaging and exportations with “captive coordination” between the 
farmers’ organization and the members because of a high level of specific assets 
and (ii) to others farmers’ organizations (represented as Organization 2) that operate 
trough formal contracting with farmers and with private firms of transformation and 
exportation (Chaves 2004). In this case the coordination mechanisms vary from 
“relational” to “captive” depending of the contract.  
- Market structures correspond to some intermediaries that directly follow market 
opportunities. This kind of coordination can still be very fruitful, since pineapple 
market is very dynamic, and intermediaries are quick to adapt to changing 
circumstances with prices providing powerful incentives. 
Currently there are no professional bodies to regulate the relationships between 
stakeholders but only an organization to represent the interest of the bigger producers. 
 
Figure 4 :  Coordination mechanisms in the pineapple sector 
 
 
2.5 Synthesis 
First, the analysis of coordination mechanisms shows a variety of situations among the 
sectors and inside each sector. As presented in the table 2, the variety of coordination 
mechanisms observed among sectors (hierarchy, hybrid with different levels, or market) 
can be explained in terms of transaction attributes in line with the transaction cost theory 
(Williamson, 1991; Menard, 2007).  
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The more the asset specificity increases, the more is developed the hierarchical 
coordination in the sector. In milk and pineapple sector were hierarchical and captive 
(hybrid) are the most developed mechanisms of coordination, the asset specificity is the 
highest. This is due to (1) the characteristics of the products and especially its perishability 
that asks for rapid and important processing (case of milk) or rapid packaging (case of 
pineapple); (2), the level of the standards which asks for high specific physical and human 
(both with well trained farmers and technicians with specific skills) investments at both 
production and processing level, to reach those high quality standards. This level of 
standards could results from (1) the marketing strategy of the leading actors of the sector 
(case of DosPinos cooperative and the development of its brand name) or (2) the demand of 
the final purchasers (case of pineapple sector and the necessity to comply with European 
and American standards - Eurepgap or bioterrorism act). On the contrary, in beef and bean 
sectors were the market or modular (hybrid) coordination dominates the asset specificity is 
low: the human and physical specific investments required as not so important since those 
products are storable and the quality standards requirement are low (no brand name 
strategy, low level of standards for national markets). 
 
The uncertainty of the transaction is higher in the bean sector, where price evolutions and 
actors behaviors can hardly be anticipated. The price risk is low in the milk sector, 
intermediate in the pineapple (at least in the medium term with a strong demand in the 
international market) and beef sector (as the producers can delay their sells in case of 
conjectural price crisis). The commercial transactions take place all year round in the beef, 
milk and pineapple sectors. But farmers sell from time to time in the beef sector, regularly 
in the pineapple sector, every day in the mil sector. It only happens during some months in 
the bean sector. 
 
This empirical analysis of the main governance structures confirms empirically the theory 
of transaction costs theory (Williamson, 1991). Nevertheless, it empirically suggests that 
the “asset specificity” is the more important key factor that influences coordination 
mechanisms in the sector.  
 
Secondly, we saw that the current prevailing coordination mechanisms are not a static 
category: on the contrary, it appears that these mechanisms changed along the time. As 
illustrated in the table 3, the trends of evolution of the main coordination mechanisms could 
be researched trough the markets conditions, including especially: (1) the level and 
dynamic of the market demand, (2) the level (or intensity) and type of products 
specifications. This suggests that hierarchical coordination tends to be developed in 
dynamic market with high intensity of specification (case of milk and pineapple). In the 
case of stable market with little specification, the market coordination tends to be 
developed.  
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Table 2: Coordination mechanisms and transaction attributes 
 Beef Bean Milk 
 
Pineapple 
Market conditions 
Level of the demand 
Trend of the demand 
 
+ 
Stable 
 
+ 
Reducing 
 
++ 
Increasing 
 
++ 
Increasing 
Asset specificity 
In general 
Including standards at farm level: 
Stringency 
Based on 
 
Low 
 
Low 
Product 
 
Low 
 
Medium 
Product 
 
High 
 
High  
Product and 
process 
 
Medium 
 
High  
Product and 
process 
Uncertainty on price Medium High Low Medium 
Frequency Medium Low High High 
Coordination mechanisms Mainly market 
Few modular 
Market 
Modular  
Mainly captive 
(DosPinos) 
Some relational 
Mainly hierarchy
 (private firms)
Captive 
Relational 
Some market 
Trend of coordination mechanisms Stable Variable Captive 
increasing 
Hierarchy 
increasing 
 
 
 
As the diversity and the trends of evolution of the main mechanisms of coordination among 
the different supply chain have been analyzed, we will now analyze the impact of the 
different coordination mechanisms and their evolution on the integration or the exclusion 
process of small farmers. . 
 
 
3 Effects of the coordination mechanisms on small farmers and on their 
organizations 
The coordination mechanisms have strong implications at farm level. Depending on their 
resources (labor, land, capital, capacities, etc.) but also on their perception of their situation, 
some farmers can adapt their farming systems to match the market requests and others shift 
to others activities or disappear. To be involved in a supply chain with specific requests 
implies to modify the farming system by buying specific inputs, investing in some specific 
equipment, or developing specific skills. It could be achieved through an intensification 
process, an increase of the farm size to make more profitable the investments, or/and a 
certain level of specialization. The dependency to one product with high specific 
investments could increase and generate more risks for the farmers in case of price crisis or 
misbehavior of one actor along the supply chain. 
 
The coordination mechanisms generate strong implication at farmers’ organization level 
too. The role and function of farmers’ organization in commodity chain could be of 
different sorts even with market coordination mechanisms. By pooling individual economic 
resources, the farmers’ organization can generate economy of scale through collective 
infrastructure or equipment. The farmers’ organization can reduce information asymmetry 
between producers and other actors of the commodity chain through the development of 
efficient information system. By pooling individual production, the farmers’ organization 
can increase producers bargaining power. Through advocacy, farmers’ organization could 
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affect the institutional arrangements along the commodity chain or the institutional 
environment (laws, rules, etc.). In a context of increasing barriers to enter the market, some 
farmers’ organizations have the capacities to answer the client’s requests and others have to 
leave the sector depending on their resources, their experiences, but also their objectives 
which can encompass more activities, and the members’ objectives. The farmers’ 
organizations strategies can be different with a specialization in one product, an integration 
of different steps inside the supply chain, or a participation in the governance of the supply 
chain; they could also tend to diversify their activities to reduce marketing risks.  
 
The case studies analysis provides some elements on the stakeholders’ strategies and the 
consequences both at farm level and farmers’ organization level.  
3.1 Beef sector 
The characteristics of the sector with (i) low risks for farmers to produce and sell the cattle 
all around the year, (ii) an efficient auction system which guarantee a fair price according to 
the market conditions, and (iii) not strict requests for quality generating unbearable 
technical specifications for some farmers, facilitate transactions through market 
coordination and the integration of small farmers. Beef production is a more secured 
production for them generating stable revenues along the year except when crisis occur on 
the international market. Small farmers often combine beef production with cheese 
production when large farmers generally have more specialized farming system. The level 
of revenues mainly depends on the size of the farm due to the existence of a single 
extensive farming system with low production costs per hectare or per animal. In this 
context of smooth market entry barriers for farmers, the number of small farmers involved 
in this supply chain rapidly increases without implying a strong degree of specialization at 
the production system level and with the maintaining of others productions for the familiar 
consumption or the market. Due to the modest added value generating per hectare trough 
beef production and due to poor specific assets for beef production that enables more 
production system flexibility, some large farmers prefer to shift from beef production to 
others more profitable productions.   
 
Due to relative efficient market coordination it seems that there is no need for strong 
farmers’ organizations. The only ones which exist in the northern region are mainly 
dedicated to control and improve the auction system aimed at maintaining efficient market 
coordination. Only a few years ago the stakeholders involved in the supply chain decided to 
create an institutional body (CORFOGA) to participate more in public policies design, to 
improve the productivity at farm level, and to reinforce quality processes because of 
emergence of new requests on the international market about inocuity. This last point could 
drastically impact small farmers in the future.  
 
3.2 Bean sector 
In this sector the market is the dominant coordination mechanism in a context of strong 
competition with imported bean and low national farmers’ competitiveness. This situation 
provokes a decrease of the incomes at farm level and drastically limits the capacity of the 
farmers to invest to improve their productivity and the quality of their product. They adopt 
a strategy of diversification of the productions at farm level (maize, rice, livestock, etc.) to 
be less dependent from the bean production and even a lot of them abandon the sector. 
Only large scale farms continue to regularly produce bean as they had invested in 
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mechanization in the past and they have some livestock to diversify the incomes and 
balance the risk related to the bean production. 
 
With a product that farmers can store for months to wait for better price and with the 
presence of numerous buyers (firms or intermediaries) offering different opportunities to 
sell, the coordination between farmers through farmers’ organizations is quiet difficult.  A 
lot of opportunistic behaviors (especially free riding, Olson 1978) occurs impeding 
strengthen them to set-up a collective action. To limit the risks run by all the stakeholders 
some contracts are established between farmers’ organizations and buyers. From the 
farmers’ organizations point of view they are aimed at to guarantee the outlets and therefore 
to secure the farmers for investing in bean production. From the buyers’ point of view they 
are aimed at limiting the transaction costs generating by individual contracts and the 
scattered availability of product (assembly costs), controlling better the quality of the 
product, and managing a regular sourcing. Nevertheless, it should be notice that this interest 
of the buyers comes only because the importations are temporarily limited by State rules 
during the harvesting period.  
 
To conclude, the problem of the inclusion of small farmers seems to depend more on other 
factors than the type of coordination mechanisms. But it appears that the market 
coordination which can occur due to the sector characteristics don’t facilitate the emergence 
of strong farmers’ organizations.  
 
3.3 Milk sector 
The needs (i) for farmers to sell rapidly the milk to avoid conservation problems and make 
profitable and secure the specific investments, (ii) for the industrial to guarantee regular 
milk supply to limit the risk related to high investments and to strictly control the quality of 
the product along the different steps, generate a coordination near the hierarchy (“captive 
coordination”) with strict and well defined rules between farmers and farmers’ organization 
or between farmers and the private sector to control the production process and define the 
payments arrangements. 
 
To face the technical specifications the farmers have to develop a specialized farming 
system highly intensified with inputs partially provided by the cooperative and with special 
equipment dealing with milking and feed operations. In such a framework the incomes are 
stable and the milk price relatively attractive but with high production costs. Not all the 
farmers are able to access to the industrialized milk sector (1380 producers at the national 
level) due to the level of the required investments and the barriers to entry the supply chain 
(entry costs, specific skills, etc.). Thus the majority of the small farmers remains in local 
market producing local cheese. Not all the farmers involved in the industrialized milk 
sector are able to adapt their farming system to ever stricter rules. Some of them 
progressively disappear from this sector and some others establish new relationships with 
others farmers’ organizations or private firms based on less stricter rules but usually with a 
lower price.  
 
For the farmers’ organizations or for the private firms the control on the design of the rules 
and the management of the milk supply area are critical. The need for strong coordination is 
a key reason explaining (i) the raise of strong farmers’ organizations competing with 
private firms, and (ii) the long tradition of the farmers’ organizations to negotiate with the 
State adequate public policies for the sector. But in fact DosPinos Cooperative acts more 
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and more as a private firm with a currently weak influence of the farmers in governance as 
the profitability of the industrial investment becomes one of the main criteria for the 
decision-making process.  
  
3.4 Pineapple sector 
Due to (i) strict technical specification for exporting pineapple including a traceability 
system and a certification process to access to some markets in Europe, (ii) very high 
production costs related to intensive agricultural techniques required (iii) the importance of 
regularity of delivery of the products, hierarchy is the dominant governance structure in the 
pineapple structure. Transnational firms or private national firms prefer to produce a large 
part of the production they need, and after to process and export it, to reduce the risks 
related to an inadequate quality and the transaction costs related to contract managing. But 
to answer to the market needs, they often negotiate long term contract with a few set of 
medium or large scale farmers to obtain an additional pineapple production with strict rules 
dealing with quality, volume, planning, and production process. Because of attractive price 
on the market this type of farmers is significantly increasing. For the same reasons of the 
big firms the farmers involved in pineapple production have to be specialized in one 
production.  
 
The small farmers produce pineapple for the national market for a long time. But the strict 
technical specification for exportation and the need to gather production from different 
farmers to answer the clients’ requests generate the creation of new and stronger farmers’ 
organizations. In this case the coordination between the farmers and the farmers’ 
organization must be well tailored to obtain the quantity and the quality at the right time 
and to determine the payment modalities based on quality. The fact that (i) farmers can 
escape from the contract with the organization because of the existence of others market 
opportunities, and (ii) the real difficulty to export directly without intermediaries (private 
firms, transnational, etc.) because all the requests along the chain, limit the farmers’ 
organization development. The coordination between the farmers’ organizations and the 
clients has to be well defined too but could be more flexible as the farmers’ organizations 
have different options (captive relationships with a private firm based on long term 
contract, relational relationships with short term contracts). The nature of the contract could 
have an effect on the inclusion or exclusion of the small farmers. As the international prices 
are attractive the number of small farmers involved in exportation lightly increases even 
with a high level of entry barriers due to high production costs. But if the certification to 
export to Europe (one of the main client) becomes a strong request a large exclusion 
process could be observed as the certification costs are unaffordable and the requests 
unachievable for small farmers. 
 
3.5 Sintesis 
 
The following tables synthesize the results. 
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Table 3: Effects of the different types of coordination mechanisms on farmers. 
Supply chain Beef Bean Milk Pineapple 
Main coordination mechanisms Mainly market 
Few modular 
Market 
Modular  
Mainly captive 
Some relational 
Mainly hierarchy
Captive 
Relational 
Some market 
Degree of specialization Low for small farm 
High for large farm 
Low  
 
High High Farmers’ 
strategies 
 Degree of intensification Low Low for small farm 
Medium for large 
farm 
High 
 
High 
Current integration of small 
farmers 
Yes  Yes  
(decreasing) 
Low  
(decreasing) 
Low  
(increasing) 
Current evolution of farmers 
- Small farm 
- Large farm 
 
++ 
- 
 
- -  
- 
 
-- 
- 
 
+ 
++ 
Risk of exclusion of farmers Low High for small farm 
Medium for large 
farm 
High for small farm 
Low for large farm 
High for small farm
Medium for large 
farm 
Stability of revenues Yes 
But some cyclical 
crises 
No 
High price 
variability 
Yes Yes 
High market price 
 
 
 
Effects 
on 
farmers 
Farm size 10-500 ha 
Decreasing 
5-100 ha 
Stable 
10-100 ha 
Increasing 
5-50 ha 
Increasing 
 
 
Table 4: Effects of different types of coordination mechanisms on farmers’ 
organizations 
Supply chain Beef Bean Milk Pineapple 
Specialization Not  relevant No Yes Yes 
Integration of function in the 
supply chain  
Not relevant Low  High  
 
Some recent 
attempts for 
packaging 
Coordination with farmers Not relevant Weak Strong Strong for 
exportation sector 
Medium for national
market 
Coordination with others 
stakeholders 
Not relevant Medium in case of 
contracts 
Weak in others cases
Medium (mainly 
with supermarkets) 
Strong for 
exportation 
Weak for national 
market 
Farmers’ 
organiza-
tions 
strategies 
Participation in supply chain 
governance 
Yes but recent Some recent 
attempts 
Yes for a long time Not relevant 
Number of FO’s Low - + ++ 
Market share of FO’s 0% 10 % 
Declining 
95 % 
 
5 % 
Raising 
 
Effects on 
farmers’ 
organiza-
tions 
Risk management at FO’s 
level 
Not relevant Low High Medium 
 
 
It is important to mention that coordination mechanisms are not sufficient to explain the 
inclusion or exclusion process of farmers. The demand and the price of the product remain 
key drivers for shaping the supply chain. But what are the implications for farmers and 
farmer’s organizations of different coordination mechanisms inside the supply chain?  
 
Hybrid with “captive coordination” can be an opportunity for farmers to participate in 
supply chain with strict technical specifications, costly specific investments, and/or high 
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risks. The results show two alternatives. First farmers can set-up their own farmers’ 
organization to vertically integrate the sector as in the milk sector case. But it requires 
strong capacities to design adequate rules between farmers and the farmers’ organization, to 
manage the industrial investments, and to negotiate with others stakeholders. This 
coordination mechanism could lead to a small farmers’ exclusion process but partially 
controlled by the farmers themselves. Building a strong farmers’ organization requires a 
long time (20 years in the case of the Dos Pinos cooperative) which was possible a few 
decades ago in a more stable institutional environment. Will new farmers’ organizations in 
others sectors have time to follow the same path in the current rapidly changing 
environment? Second the integration could be under the control of a private firm which 
controls all the process through strict contracts. In this framework only a few large scale 
farmers are able participate in the supply chain with high risks of exit in case of crisis in the 
sector. The internal policy of the private firm may mitigate the scope of exclusion as social 
standards could be more or less important. 
 
Other hybrid coordination may be a good opportunity to favor smallholder farmers’ 
inclusion. There are encouraging experiences in the case of the bean sector with farmers’ 
organizations collecting and selling farmers’ product and with annual contracts between 
farmers’ organizations and private firms which directly supply supermarkets. In the case of 
the pineapple sector, some strong farmers’ organizations are able to facilitate access to 
market for smallholders even with strict technical specifications for exported product. The 
rules regulating the coordination mechanisms must be well designed between the farmers 
and the farmers’ organization and/or between the farmers’ organization and the clients. But 
hybrid coordination enables some flexibility for defining rules between stakeholders that 
gives more time and more diversified solutions for facilitating the farming system 
adaptation of the small farmers to meet the evolving market requests.  
 
Market governance could be an inclusive mechanism for small farmers if the technical 
specifications are smooth and with efficient and transparent mechanism as auction system 
in the case of the beef sector. In this situation there is little need for strong farmers’ 
organizations as farmers can easily sell their products without promoting a collective 
action. Farmers’ organizations are devoted to participate in the auction system management 
and to defend their interests at a policy level as well as promote technical innovations that 
enable to reduce production costs and increase quality. 
 
 
The key point is the farmers’ organization capacity for really participating in the supply 
chain. This depends on the characteristics of the product and the supply chain, and the 
human and financial resources the farmers’ organization can mobilize.  Farmers can 
influence the rules of the game at the farmers’ organization level depending on its 
negotiation power. But taking into account asymmetric relationships between the 
stakeholders, its capacity to influence the rules is usually weak. Farmers’ influence could 
increase through unions between farmers’ organizations or through professional bodies as 
in the case of the bean sector. 
 
If the diversity of main mechanisms among the different supply chain has been partially 
explained, the variability inside a sector still requires to be further analyzed, it could play 
an important role in integration of small farmers to the commodity chain.  
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4 Conclusion 
The paper indicates that small holders’ integration inside supply chains largely depends on 
the type of coordination mechanisms. In the case of low technical specifications and 
adequate and transparent selling mechanisms, the market coordination could be efficient to 
improve small farmers’ inclusion. However, in the case of high technical specifications by 
downstream stakeholders, production and transaction costs raise and as a result there is a 
need for more secured relationships. Hybrid coordination through “captive coordination” 
could be an alternative for larger farmers which can afford costly investments but tend to be 
a selective process that lead to a strong exclusion of small farmers. Contract farming 
through “relational coordination” or “modular coordination”, as an intermediary 
coordination mechanism, represents an opportunity for inclusion, enabling farmers to enter 
in the necessary learning process. In this case the intensity of the inclusion process largely 
depends on the capacity of the farmers’ organizations to negotiate adequate contracts and to 
bring relevant services to their members especially in order to help them to comply with 
standards and market requests. But it also depends on publics policies for providing an 
enabling environment for farmers’ organizations. 
 
Thus, the capability of farmers’ organizations to negotiate contracts with others 
stakeholders and to monitor them, is a key factor of organizations’ development and small 
holders’ market integration. It claims for higher public investments to strengthen farmers’ 
organizations through adequate trainings and assistance. It claims also for the strengthening 
of the dialogue between farmers’ organizations and the State to develop innovative services 
mechanisms and public policies that facilitate their market integration.    
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